Equilibrium (Spanish Edition)

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  1. ISBN 13: 9786071715135
  2. Equilibrium radionucleotide angiography | English to Spanish | Medical: Health Care
  3. Our Personality Diversity Indicator App

A flat-screen TV is provided. The villa offers a hot tub. A terrace can be found at Villa Equilibrium Costa Adeje, along with a garden. Aqualand is 3. Villa Equilibrium Costa Adeje has been welcoming Booking. We're sorry, but there was an error submitting your comment. Please try again.

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Availability We Price Match. When would you like to stay at Villa Equilibrium Costa Adeje? Reservations longer than 30 nights are not possible. Enter your dates to check availability. Your departure date is invalid. Check-in Date. Check-out Date. Free WiFi! Parking: Free! Select everything you want to know more about. What do you want to know about the options you selected? Enter your feedback. The notion of community we are considering here entails a social network linking its members through principles of territorial proximity, sense of belonging, mutual recognition, moral obligation, ruled cooperation, the ritualised renovation of symbols and strict exclusion limits.

This link does not imply equality among its members, owing to the existence of class and gender discriminatory bias, nor does it imply uniqueness, as nesting or overlapping of a plurality of communities is possible for example, communities of irrigators overlapping with village communities, guild communities nesting within urban communities, etc. So, then, how can we explain the long-term survival of institutions of a communal type? Elinor Ostrom identified eight basic formative features shared by long-enduring communal institutions: well-defined limits, the adaptation of rules to local conditions, user participation channels, monitoring systems and scaled sanctions, conflict resolving mechanisms, a certain degree of autonomy from external powers, and an ordered structure of relationships within wider-ranging systems Ostrom , pp.

This scheme enables the reconciliation of presumably archaic and inefficient institutions with familiar criteria of instrumental rationality, but does not answer the main question: Did they last over several centuries because they were efficient — in Pareto's terms — in resource allocation?

ISBN 13: 9786071715135

And if not, why were they not replaced before that by more efficient institutions? Amit Bhaduri expressly addressed this question and proposed a way to solve the problem through a wider understanding of the notion of efficiency that included not only the context of production, but also that of distribution. This could explain the survival of a production-inefficient institutional structure providing it was class-efficient Bhaduri , pp.

An archaic institutional framework would have maintained the separation of the two rates of benefit, while changes in property rights — in the sense of making them individual and absolute — would have brought them together and thus spurred modern economic growth North and Thomas , p. The hypothesis offered here is that under conditions of low crop yields, restricted productive specialisation and the reproduction of family productive units under conditions of high mortality and the regular surplus extraction that characterised preindustrial economy, the communal institution would have allowed an optimal relationship to exist between both levels, that of class efficiency and that of productive efficiency in Bhaduri's terms , or between the private benefit rate and the social benefit rate if one prefers the language of North and Thomas.

The communal regime would therefore have followed an equilibrium path, understood in a double dimension: balance in the sustainable use of resources and balance in the maintenance of an inequitable society subject to regular and institutionalised exactions. The very design of the normative structure of the communal organisation could be understood as a point of equilibrium in a complex process of interaction — often a conflictive one — with the natural medium and the surplus detracting powers.

Equilibrium radionucleotide angiography | English to Spanish | Medical: Health Care

For the same reason this design would be orientated toward guaranteeing the reproduction of these communities in certain production and distribution contexts. The diversity of contexts and points of equilibrium would help to explain the variety of access and management modes of the common resources that are historically found De Moor et al. The hypothesis followed here supposes a disruption of that secular equilibrium when international trade and industrialisation allowed growing specialisation, and at the same time that the creation of modern nation states altered the surplus detracting conditions.

If we adopt Kuznets's hypothesis Kuznets , pp. Using Bhaduri's terms, the increased class efficiency promised by the new conditions would have demanded the dismantling of the communal regime. It is then, between and , when the strongest attacks on property rights and communal usage took place. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the peripheral areas of industrialisation, common property could acquire a renewed value within this new context as it became a medium for marginally reducing inequality and enabling the approximation of private and social benefit rates.

Our hypothesis concludes that within this scenario, the value of commonlands shifted from the notion of equilibrium to that of equity. The pages below develop a case study ordered in two sequences. In the first, the features of the different identifiable communal regimes in Navarra during the feudal period are analysed.

The second describes their dismantling and defends the permanence of community values within a new context marked by the notion of equity. Among the most significant features of European rural communities from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century was the ubiquity of common lands, especially of wastelands, as well as the diversity of management systems and governing institutions.

These different communal land tenures, as well as their institutions and uses, did not remain unchanged from the Middle Ages to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but they did generally maintain a noticeable structural continuity. How can this diversity of systems and institutions be explained? And in light of this, how can we account for their secular permanence?

We maintain that the commons played an important role in the stability of preindustrial society, both in their organisation of resource exploitation and in their relationships of feudal control and income distribution. Diversity in institutional articulation should be associated with different environmental factors and different social and political structures.

Despite its small size, Navarra is an excellent model for studying this diversity. This territory can be divided into five zones, each having different social agrosystems. Over a layer of silicon rocks from the Palaeozoic era, soils are acid and slopes are pronounced. Because of this, the arable area is very limited mainly devoted to maize, wheat, and forage in enclosed fields and the local economy is based on livestock cows and sheep.

Here we find a mixed form of habitation, with some towns villas or concentrated settlements and a great number of isolated farms in Basque, baserriak. A large number of these farms belonged to landowners living in cities, and were cultivated by sharecroppers. Thus, the provision of the workforce necessary to carry out the production process was entrusted to family and not to the market.

The relationship between independent agricultural producers and the wage-earning population, which amounted to 45 wage-earners mostly integrated in the producer's family as servants per producers, shows the preponderance of familial agriculture. On the other hand, opportunities offered by protoindustry mainly iron and the semiurban nature of the communities explain the higher population density and greater occupational diversity than was true for the rest of the country.

Access to the commons was limited to vecinos those who owned an entitled house with common rights , while a large part of the local community in Basque, maisterrak was excluded from common rights and political bodies. This strong sense of closed community and the broad autonomy of these communities in designating their authorities were direct consequences of the defeat of feudal lords in the wars of noble lineages in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 8 Caro Baroja , pp. The northeast of Navarra Zone II is largely alpine. Winter is therefore very long, and the number of frost-free days are few.

The local economy was based on subsistence agriculture, nomadic flocks, and timber. Because of the low population density and the strained border relationships with France, the Spanish Crown retained greater control of the wastelands in this region and local authorities, so that the mayors of the valleys were designated by the viceroy from lists of three candidates proposed by the villages. In the more extensive and populated Zone III, settlements are largely dominated by hamlets lugares , with inhabitants for a medium-sized hamlet. The topography is less rugged than in the mountainous areas, and the valleys are wider, allowing cultivation of wheat, barley, oats, legumes, and — on the south side — vineyards.

In this landscape of open fields and forests beech forests in the north and holm-oak groves in the south , hamlets are scattered as small groups of houses around churches. The social structure was dominated by a large number of small agricultural producers who gained control of their land through property ownership or rental, and mainly relied on a familial workforce.

The most extensive farms supplemented their workforce through wage labourers, who were generally incorporated in the household as servants. Hamlets were grouped in districts valles , cendeas in order to establish their relationships to external agents and to make some wastelands profitable. Each district had its own authorities mayor, deputy, or juror and officials, who were directly designated by external powers lords, abbeys, and kings , or elected in other cases by the community itself through various procedures voting, drawing lots, taking turns, co-optation , or a mixed system of presentation of candidates by the community for external designation.

Access to the commons was linked to the condition of vecino owner and resident in an entitled house , while regulation of the commons was carried out through assemblies concejo ; in Basque, batzarre. Commoners approved and reformed bylaws rules and sanctions , admitted or rejected new commoners, designated officials, and finally resolved disputes and imposed fines in these assemblies. A distinctive feature of this area is that some foreigners had access to the commons, as they were acknowledged as vecinos foranos foreign commoners , a privilege reserved for nobles who owned an entitled house — even if it was in ruins.

Zone IV has very different and more extreme features, both socially and environmentally. Here there is a Mediterranean plain that varies from sandstone to clay and gypsum with alluvial soils. Vegetation is of the prairie type and woodlands are rare. Cereals, legumes, hemp, wine, and olive oil were the crops in arable lands over fluvial terraces, thanks to the intricate system of dams and canals, while sheep breeding produced wool and mutton in the dry highest pastures and wastelands.

The complex, expensive irrigation system and the cooperative network that was required explain the concentration of settlements in larger villages and towns villas. Land ownership tended to be concentrated among a few nobility, Church, urban oligarchy , and tenants obtained arable land through lease or sharecropping.

These statistics mean that it was the market rather than the family that played the main role in the workforce in the production process. The labour market was characterised by a wide, scattered pool, which made these wage earners very vulnerable: their contracts did not make for a great deal of security or stability. Moreover, the semi-urban nature of the centres explains the higher presence of artisans clustered in guilds , traders, employees, and clergy.

The main institution that connected resources crops, grazing, manure, hunting, firewood, fibre grass, and building materials to users was the municipality. Designation of authorities always fell to external powers: in many cases it was feudal lords who directly appointed the mayor, while in other cases mayors were appointed by the viceroy from a list of three candidates proposed by the villages.

This reduced the autonomy of the communities, although they retained wider control in the appointment of lower authorities and administrative and economic management. Politically, the main authorities alcaldes were appointed by the viceroy from lists submitted by the towns, although here, too, the lower authorities regidores had a representative although often oligarchic character. To sum up, in general we find in Navarra two models of communal land tenure that correspond to very different environmental and social conditions: One is the model of a closed community in which access rights to the commons are linked to the possession of a given agricultural exploitation and to recognition as a vecino , which accords with the predominance of familial production over wage labourers and populations concentrated in small centres.

The other is a model of an open community in which the municipality is the axis that holds the systems together. Access rights to the commons are less restrictive, although uses are very unequal, and are based on a more complex social structure of an urban or semiurban nature, with a major presence of wage labourers and the great importance of feudal lords. Because of its complexity, the second model requires further explanation. Despite the exogenous appointment of the main authorities, there was a margin for autonomous management of common resources in Zones IV and V.

The material basis of the municipality centred on bienes de propios municipal properties such as arable lands, pasture lands, mills, ovens, etc. The public butcher used to have his own cattle and enclosed pastures on the commons. Boundaries of resources and property rights were well defined.


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  5. The municipality would designate one or more corralizas exclusively to the public butcher and the rest were auctioned and rented for short periods to sheep breeders. There was a coherent articulation of private ownership, municipal properties, and common rights that was far removed from the mechanical individual-collective opposition. At the core of this was the municipality, which was organised in two levels: the assembly concejo and the political council regimiento. During the eighteenth century, in a context of demographic growth, open assemblies of vecinos junta de concejo tended to be replaced by local councils made up of 21 wealthy persons resident in the town; the juntas de veintena.

    However, municipality was not the sole institution with authority in the management of the commons. Local guilds of cattlemen mestas and councils of landowners with irrigated fields diputaciones de campos were specific institutions with competence in pasture and water management. Mestas grouped cattle breeders in the village, assuring workforce control and isolation of diseased livestock, resolving disputes, and representing them in their relations with other institutions.

    These councils designated the officials who distributed the water and protected its proper use, maintained the dams and canals, apportioned the cost of repairs among the commoners, punished criminal behaviour, and resolved disputes Yanguas y Miranda , pp. These institutions operated as communities within the community, but despite this coincidence, the concejo the distinctive form of municipal power from the medieval period was the core of political and social life. And who were the commoners who enjoyed the resources? First, there were cattle breeders associated in the mesta.

    Second, farmers would combine their horses, mules, donkeys, and oxen in collective herds generally known as dula , using the rich pastures of the sotos wooded meadows along the rivers, and excluding others from them. Fourth, under certain conditions all commoners were allowed to take certain products from the commons such as firewood, rush Juncus sp. All these people could also use the pasture of private open fields after harvest, provided they respected some particular customs, such as ricios fields sown with unmown grain and sobreaguas a specific time following the rains in which the soil was still moist.

    Rules of use were regulated through bylaws approved by the concejo and confirmed by the royal court. The bylaws enumerated many detailed conditions: annual periods of use, times when use was forbidden, specifications for limiting the number of livestock, form of denouncing violators, scale of fines, forms of collection, and distribution, etc. Violations of these rules would be adjudicated in the local court audiencia de concejo , where judges listened to the plaintiff and defendant, and imposed a penalty according to the bylaws.

    In short, we find a diverse, complex and highly detailed system that guaranteed access to and use of natural resources for a large part of society, and also tended to guarantee the continuity of these resources. This was possible because the community was well defined, and had internal and external ties and balances. But was the system equitable? The answer is no. In particular, the larger breeders, who were associated in guilds, were most favoured in this system, as they were able to divide and use the pastures at a nominal cost, and sometimes at no cost.

    Large farmers could feed their horses and oxen in the pastures of the dula. Noblemen hidalgos enjoyed the privilege of using twice as much as commoners and could use the commons of several villages as vecinos foranos Yanguas y Miranda , pp. The concejo common system was not designed to repair injustices but to maintain a balance in a vulnerable society. This system underwent a severe crisis in the first half of the nineteenth century. As in other parts of Europe, there were various causes of the crisis and dissolution of the commons. The wave of demographic growth during the eighteenth century 0.

    Parallel to this, there began to unfold a slow transformation of the social structure, with a growing gulf between the wealthy and the poor, irrespective of the boundaries of the estamento society. Thus, the wealthiest members of the lower orders merchants, manufacturers, cattle breeders, and wealthy farmers tended to come together with the privileged classes hidalgos. They combined in local closed councils juntas de veintena in the second half of the eighteenth century, functioning as a single social class of propietarios bourgeois in the first half of the nineteenth century.

    This group was able to retain their control on local political power in a liberal state because of restricted suffrage Castro , pp. Other social sectors tended to become impoverished because of population growth, division of land, and price fluctuations. Cattle breeders and landowners opposed this because the cultivation of the commons might harm their interests: for the former, it would reduce the available pasturage and could weaken guild control; for the latter, increasing the available land would make it more difficult to rent out their properties.

    Marcos Martin At the same time, feudal earnings and prerogatives tended to be challenged by tenants through payment arrears and riots. The privileges of the vecinos foranos were refused. The Church also experienced problems in collecting its tithes De la Torre , pp. A serious breakdown in the community was becoming apparent, centred on control and management of common lands.

    The finances of the Spanish Crown and the municipal treasuries were exhausted from the lengthy wars of —96, —14, —23, and — The backbone of the concejo system finally broke. To solve their financial difficulties, local councils regimientos with the approval of juntas de veintena began to sell not only municipal properties municipal lands and pastures, buildings, mills, etc. Nearly 79, hectares of common land 7.

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    Most of these sales took place in areas of plain and concentrated habitation Zones IV and V where communal land tenure was held in municipal institutions. Mountain areas Zones I and II, and III to a lesser extent , where rights over the commons had been reserved to particular houses, to the exclusion of other residents, generally escaped the massive sales of common land but their old system was changed in the construction of the modern state, which gave the common property to town councils and extended the right of vecindad to all taxpayers who resided in the village.

    Guilds of cattle breeders mestas were banned in Yanguas y Miranda , p. The old institutional framework of the commons seemed to be dying and a new territorial organisation was emerging, as can be seen in Figure 3. As in other parts of Europe, the commons were severely affected. Physiocratic censure for common property in the Enlightenment meant the institution was dismantled in the age of Liberalism.

    Agrarian individualism was advanced as the sole alternative to progress Bloch , pp. Nevertheless, there were still some community ties after the collapse of the ancien regime. The adaptation of the idea of community to the new conditions and the significance of commons in a capitalist context are argued here in four ways.

    First, common property did not disappear. As can be seen in Table 1 , common lands still occupied almost half a million hectares in Navarra. Even in Zones IV and V, where processes of sale and dismantling of communal land tenure were more intense, common lands still amounts to 40 percent of the total surface area. Most of the property on these lands belongs to the municipalities, however, confusing the notion of public and common property.

    Nevertheless, this continuity should not automatically be interpreted as a survival of community. When ideas of communal and public ownership become indistinguishable, the original sense of the old community — which established exclusions of variable geometry and linked its members according to an unequal, hierarchic, and apparently natural set of rights and duties — seems to be lost. What is very significant is the persistence of collective flocks and the maintenance of shepherding on private lands in open fields up to the first half of the twentieth century. These had been legally abolished in The second argument refers to the nature of the sales of common lands.

    Often, some rights to resources were reserved for users and municipalities Table 2. Indeed, in of the extensive pasture estates corralizas that were sold from to , commoners retained the right to graze working cattle as a collective herd dula only in certain seasons of the year. In cases, sales contracts preserved pasture rights for collective herds sheep, cattle at certain times and under certain conditions goats, and sometimes cows and oxen, were usually forbidden : In estates that were sold, traditional users were still allowed the right to gather firewood: in 64 cases they could still plough and cultivate crops; and in 55 cases they could withdraw esparto fibre grass and stone.

    Sales also respected arable lands occupied by commoners, thus facilitating their conversion to private property. In a few cases, sales allowed ploughing and sowing, or plantation of vineyards.

    How to say 'chemical equilibrium' in Spanish?

    This is not only anecdotal and reveals something about the nature of the privatisation and individualisation process taking place. The interaction between individuals and classes in a rapid and uncertain process of social and political change allowed the maintenance of some collective uses in favour of the local groups.

    State administration also respected and retained some resources for their traditional users: users maintained their rights over firewood in 39 percent of the pastures sold; in 33 percent they were able to continue extracting stone for building and gathering esparto for cordage; and in 20 percent they preserved hunting rights. The difference between both stages of the sale process is that town councils — during the period in which the sale process was under their control — tended to guarantee the possibility of continuing to use the pastures for common herds and to respect the right to plough; that is, town councils tried to safeguard the interests of labradores , the rural middle class of independent producers that had access to the local political institutions that impelled sales.

    When the state assumed control of the process, shepherding rights were cast aside, and reserved uses such as servidumbres charges on property were more likely to be in favour of the rural lower classes, which could obtain supplementary incomes through re-collection and sale of such products as firewood, esparto , stone, or game. It thus reinforced a function for common goods and rights in favour of the poor, those who had not had any previous capital.

    The third argument relates to the emergence of some institutions that can be considered as clubs of commoners. In other cases, societies later emerged that intended to purchase lands for private landowners Sabio More than once lands were distributed between partners after a short time, but these cooperatives frequently survived for many years, providing important services to the area electricity, a sewage system, running water. This was a response to interference by the liberal state in local spaces, substituting the old open community based on the municipality with a new form of closed community, like a club similar to the German Markgenossenschaften Brakensiek , pp.

    The fourth and last argument refers to the link between common lands and social movements in the age of democracy. Table 3 illustrates the local effects of this limited political reform. In the village of Valtierra, a revolt led to a claim for distribution of arable lots in the sotos wooded meadows in , but the actual distribution had to wait for the change of political regime in , which carried it out. The structure of landholding changed thanks to this reform. The number of landholders increased 3. This served to consolidate landholdings of under one hectare.

    It could have effects on the labour market and on rents because workers and tenants improved their negotiating power.


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    6. When the term expired, allotments were usually renewed under similar regulations. Democracy scarcely lasted six troubled years, but did put in place some of the guidelines that were to characterise the twentieth century. First, the labour question was placed at the centre of the political debate and thus the egalitarian challenge of a socialism that was still marginal. For the rural lower classes, these new ideas and this new language were not separate from the way they understood the commons: they viewed it as an opportunity to survive and help fulfil their unsatisfied demands for sharing the land.

      In this way the rural labour movement claimed to uphold the idea of community, an idea that took hold and matured from the end of the nineteenth century up to Majuelo , pp. This idea included recovery of the transferred and misappropriated common goods as its principal demand. The last objective of this comunero movement which was ideologically ambiguous because it could also include social sectors identified with traditionalism carlismo , social Catholicism, socialism, and anarchism was to consolidate a network of small independent producers that had to adhere to the periodic redistribution of plots in the conserved and recovered common lands Majuelo , pp.

      Figure 4 illustrates the chronology of these land distributions and enables us to see how the authorities in certain situations allowed for egalitarian cultivation to avoid the consequences the drop in real wages could have had on public order. This was not the case in the period from to , when hardly any new distributions took place. The political factor again became important with the crisis in Primo's dictatorship and the proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic in Malefakis , pp.

      In addition to the extraordinary impulse given to the distribution of common plots, there was a definitive admission of the social purpose of common property through a reform of the municipal regulations of Navarra which excluded the wealthy from distributions and foresaw second plots for needy families. The recovery of privatised common goods was to be dealt with in a future law whose procedures were suspended by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in Robledo , pp.

      A survey performed by the provincial government in allows measurement of the impact of this distribution policy. Its relative incidence was much higher in towns in Zone IV, however, where 63 percent of the plots were concentrated, and in some cities such as Tudela, Corella or Tafalla. On the other hand, the number of users contrasts with the 93, owners of private lands in the province, which yields a proportion of 42 commoners for every owners. It is not strange therefore that the commons has become one of the hallmarks of the province.

      Today it is maintained as such by both villages and public administration, in spite of the fact that the industrialisation of the s and the social changes associated with it have substantially modified the context in which the egalitarian paradigm of the commons was developed. The first part of this study maintains that the diversity of forms and long duration of common institutions that existed in Navarra before the nineteenth century can only be explained in terms of their adaptation to very different ecological and sociological environments.

      The common institutions contributed to the enduring quality of these environments because their main function was precisely to maintain the delicate equilibria of a vulnerable society, equilibria that affected the sustainable use of resources in conditions of low productivity and provided continuing incomes to the feudal monarchy, nobles, and the Church.

      That the design and operation of these institutions emphasised the notion of equilibrium does not imply that the system remained in equilibrium at all times, just as the later importance of the concept of equity does not mean that the system was completely equitable. It was especially the equilibria of the system that crumbled between the last decades of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth century, which facilitated a large-scale privatisation of common goods and a substantial reduction in collective uses.

      The second part of this study analyses the process of change, and its consequences and limits. In spite of the fact that Spain, as elsewhere in Europe, experienced a formidable movement against communal land tenure, I maintain that community as a social link, and the common lands themselves, persisted, although with noticeable modifications. This idea is supported by the conservation of a substantial amount of municipal wealth and the persistence of collective practices such as collective flocks and open fields. Finally, we have stressed the role the commons played as a symbol and the strategic objective of collective action in zones with a major presence of agricultural landless workers.

      It is within the heart of this social comunero movement — which reached maturity during the brief but intense period of the Second Spanish Republic — that the notion of equity flourished more strongly as the backbone and reason for common lands to exist. The historical commons did not involve equity; in fact, the use of and profits from the commons were very unequal. Yet, after the Liberal Revolution and before the great structural transformation of the mid-twentieth century, the commons became synonymous with equitable uses.

      Metaphorically, they came to be regarded as the bread of the poor. This paradox can be explained by the great transformation that took place between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The emergence and consolidation of capitalism stripped the historical commons of meaning and permanence, a development observed with astonishment and disbelief by the urban world. Once the feudal structure which had been the context in which the operation of common lands made sense was dissolved, the notion of equilibrium was replaced by the notion of equity under capitalism.

      Both the urban academic observers and the rural lower classes agreed on that interpretation, although the latter reinterpreted the moral imperative of the community and the social role of common rights and goods. Community does not constitute an archaic form of socialisation. In the latter, property and use belonged to certain houses, whether resident or not in the region, according to participation quotes that could be sold without restrictions Saavedra , p. Also in England the rights of access to the commons were associated with land property or possession, usually in the framework of the manor Winchester , p.

      It refers to the ecological and socioeconomic relationships in the reproduction of rural societies. In the Valley of Baztan there were vecinos in and in , but in there were , and in In some districts of Navarra this condition was extended to all the natives as a collective privilege Otazu , pp. In the majority of inhabitants in these valleys had the title of vecinos Many of the villages in this zone did not formalise their bylaws in the royal courts, since they had been formed through informal enforcement.

      I have only been able to locate confirmation bylaw processes of a total number of villages from to in the computer inventory of the section of Processes of the General Archive of Navarra. One child extracted three names from the first bag that were presented to the viceroy. In the town paid 1, ducados with the aim of extinguishing this system, and since then the first name extracted was designated alcalde. This system finished in Yanguas y Miranda , pp. These frictions illustrate their relationships. Thus, in the village of Arguedas, the 24 livestock farmers on the mesta raffled off the use of the pastures of 13 corralizas from the 1 st November to 3 rd of May.

      There were 4, head of sheep, with the farmers paying a canon per head, favouring the vecinos. The canon was increased from to from 1. When the municipality threatened not to allow the raffle for the 13 corralizas to occur, but to auction off their use to the highest bidder, the mesta agreed to sign a payment obligation, but expected to appeal the decision of the court after the uncertainty caused by the Napoleonic invasion was resolved Archivo General de Navarra, section of Protocols, Arguedas; notary A. However, there were significant precedents. In , law no. In —18 they extended this act to those settlements with more than 50 households Cuadernos de las Leyes , vol.

      I, pp. With the Act of Town Councils in , suffrage was extended so that it was inversely proportional to the size of the municipality in question. Ruiz, lg. Soler Falces, lg. Echarte, lg. Esparza, lg. Suescun, lg. Lazcano, lg. Alzugaray, lg. Biurrun, lg. Izaguirre, lg. Erro, lg. Gurrea, lg. Jaurrieta, lg. Romeo, lg. Moreno, lg. Guerrero, lg. Lapuerta, lg. This is not exceptional in Europe. Cutileiro , pp.